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Dignity or Efficiency? - Malaysian Monarchy at the Fringes
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By Ho Yi Jian
“The monarchy is extended to Malaysians of all ethnic groups who accept its constitutional identity and live comfortably with its Malay-oriented social dimension,” declared His Royal Highness Raja Nazrin Shah in 2004. As a representative of the monarchy, his speech represents the Malaysian sultanates and how they view themselves in larger fabric of Malaysian society.
Within the same speech, His Royal Highness rightly claimed that the Malaysian monarchy is not merely symbolic. It has substantively contributed to the stability and harmony of Malaysia. Then he continues by detailing the monarchical system of Malaysia, by explaining the relationship between the states and the federal government, the conference of rulers, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the relationship between monarchy and Islam.
However, it’s not enough to think about the formal structure of any system, and how such a system can be a force for good. There are many instances where the Malaysian monarchy has indeed acted for good. But many constitutional systems and institutions, monarchical or not, all begin with the best of intentions and fail to live up to expectations. For example, the 1997 constitution of Thailand, was hailed by many to be the most democratic constitution of Thailand to date. It did not survive a decade and was thrown out in a 2005 coup. Thus, a more realistic and useful way to think about the Malaysian monarchy as a feature of our constitutions is to examine is how the theory of constitutional monarchy conforms or deviates from the ideal, and objectively find out what kind of results stem from such an institutional design.
The 2009 constitutional crisis of Perak serves to highlight one of the few incidences where the monarch plays a controversial role in the life of Malaysian democracy. The last one was after the 2008 election, the sultan of Terengganu refused to recognise the incumbent Mentri Besar as well. Looking back into the history of Malaysia (i.e. since 1964, the federation of 14 states), these cases alone are not isolated. There have been more cases in which the monarchy played a controversial role.
It is under these cases that I have begun to think about constitutional monarchy. It is not out of spite or rejection of the monarchy that I begun this endeavour, but instead come as a humble Malaysian trying to find a better Malaysia in which a monarchy can do more for Malaysian integration. With this, I wish to take a look at constitutional monarchies in comparative perspective and what it means for Malaysia. What are the experiences of other countries with their monarchs, compared to ours? Are we blessed, or are we cursed? How can we predict the preferences of monarchs? What are the strengths and weaknesses of our system of constitutional monarchy?
What is the theory of constitutional monarchy? What are the intellectual justifications for it? In my research of the wider history of monarchy there are echoes of similar reasoning between foreign royalists and supporters of royalism. For example:
Supporters of absolutism claimed to be interested solely in the larger well-being and security of the territorial state in a world of hostile neighbours. …[T]hey saw the dramatic enhancement of royal authority as essential to domestic tranquility and international respectability.
W. M. Spellman, Monarchies 1000-2000. p 199
More recent theories of monarchy cite the following:
- As a fail-safe device when democratic processes fail to produce satisfactory outcomes. Monarchies can effectively break the political deadlock, as in Spain or Thailand in 1992.
- As a spearhead of reform, citing the King of Bhutan democratizing the country, the emir of Qatar founding al-Jazeera and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia appointing a woman as Deputy Minister.
- A symbolic figure that unites figures, like in Malaysia and as the Belgian king in multiracial societies.
While they acknowledge that not all monarchs are benevolent, they give that the constitutional aspect of constitutional monarchy can act as a check between monarch and government. To prevent such excesses by a less-than-admirable monarchy, a constitution should ideally place the monarch only as an actor of “last resort”.
However, these principles, while benevolent and well-intentioned, are somewhat in contradiction with each other. If a monarch takes the constitutional function as a last-resort “guardian of society” to break political deadlock, then he/she is restricted as a spearhead of reform. Indeed, the examples given of reform-minded monarchs are only applicable to the few absolute monarchies that remain in the contemporary world today.
Secondly, the role of the “last resort guardian of society” and the role of symbolic unifier of a nation-state are also contradictory roles. I find Walter Bagehot’s theoretical insights extremely useful and relevant to the Malaysian setting. He wrote that “dignified element” or the symbolic unifier function of monarchs was dependent on the “withering-away of its ‘efficient functions’ of its prerogatives, of its power” (Bogdanor, p37). That is to say, whenever a monarch intervenes in society to allocate political outcomes, the usual outcome is to alienate a section of society. In turn, the monarch becomes less than unifying in the totality of the nation-state. It has been suspected by academics that the Thai King is not completely objective and has some pro-capitalist biases.
In Malaysia, it is indeed true that Malay and non-Malay alike pay their due respects to royalty and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This signifies at least a superficial unifying function of the monarchy. In my opinion, I think the situation is more complex: Malay royalists love and respect the king as a symbol of Malay pride and as a symbol of Malay tradition; non-Malays respect the King out of their unique political position as the minority in Malaysia, and is born out of political accommodation.
At a cultural level, the pomp and spectacle of the sultanate is not as noticed by the non-Malay communities compared to Malay communities. At the political level, the Malaysian monarchy is prevented from serving its dignified function to a totality of society because they are constitutionally bound to defend Malay rights - possibly at the expense of non-Malay rights. It is also possible that the May 13 riots serve as a historical deterrent as the questioning of Malay special rights and the status of the Malay monarchs by non-Malay opposition could not be tolerated for the royalists. In this sense, the Bersih rally helped legitimize the growth of the opposition’s power in Parliament due to the opposition’s acknowledgement of the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
In any case, the activism of the Malaysian sultanate as an elevated status symbol with effective state powers can be divisive even beyond of ethnic lines. One example would be the 1977 constitutional crisis in Kelantan. The sultan then attempted to find a new Chief Minister without the need for elections. The sultan’s choice would most certainly be an UMNO chief minister instead of a PAS assemblyman, leading to friction between the two political allies then.
If we know that the institution of the monarchy is set up by the constitution to only have a limited unifying effect and has different effects on different communities, then what can possibly fall through the cracks of the ‘efficient functions’ of constitutional monarchy?
There are two possible ways to approach the subject of the efficiency of the monarch, or the effectiveness of monarchs to solve political deadlock. One way is to ensure the character of the monarch is always statesman-like. It is then hoped that such a monarch will act to unify and not divide under challenging circumstances. The other way is to look at those circumstances themselves - which will require a comparative study of democratic constitutional crises and make constitutional provisions to prevent monarchs from implementing divisive measures. I shall touch on both briefly, with respect to international and domestic trends.
Comparatively, the character of monarchs seems to be a probabilistic issue. For every popular monarch, constitutional or absolute, there seems to be another that is less than respectable. For instance, Queen Victoria restored the prestige of the English throne from her predecessors, George III, George IV, and William IV who had been described as “an imbecile, a profligate and a buffoon” respectively. Even the current King of Thailand cannot guarantee a worthy successor - his eldest son is known to be a womanizer and is not seen to be a suitable heir. With no great pride, Roger Kershaw, in his book Monarchy in South-East Asia, documents the election of one of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who had a besmirched record and questionable personal standing amongst the other royalty at the time (Kershaw, 104-105). Even though it is possible to remove from royalty those who display a lifestyle not fitting royalty, it seems rare to do so and not particularly sufficient to guarantee an enlightened monarch.
On the other hand, if there was a way to guarantee some integrity of character, it probably would be the Conference of Rulers. Nevertheless, the conference of Rulers as a conference could be a potential location for moderation and rational discussion — which better garners legitimacy in their rulings. Their power to remove a Yang di-Pertuan Agong shows that that royal office is not completely unaccountable and therefore more suited to the ‘efficient’ element of royal functions. However, it also seems that most constitutional crises in Malaysia occur not at the federal level, due to Barisan Nasional’s dominance in Parliament, but at the state. Therefore, in terms of need, we need a truly symbolic Agong who speaks up for all Malaysians regardless of race or ethnicity, and monarchs who can be trusted to act righteously (and such actions are delineated by constitutional safeguards on royal intervention) in dire situations.
The other approach entails looking at constitutional crises in Malaysia and other constitutional crises in other countries as well. It is often the case that the crisis would be an inability to create or dissolve government due to the loss of support or legitimacy in the current Parliament. It has happened in South Africa and the UK, where the prime minister could not dissolve parliament after losing majority support. Bogdanor rightly points out that it is not the case that “whether the sovereign is entitled to refuse a dissolution, but rather under what conditions he or she is entitled to refuse one” (Bogdanor, p 80-81). This is clearly the case in the Constitutional Crisis of Perak 2009, and many opposition sympathizers claim that had the Sultan of Perak called for the dissolution of government the current quagmire would not have happened. Similarly, the same logic of reasoning appears for the earlier 1977 Kelantan Crisis as well.
All in all, I have endeavoured to discuss Malaysian royalism under the lens of Bagehot’s “dignified” and “efficient” elements of constitutional monarchy, especially at their limits of power. In order for Malaysian royalism to be truly unifying, the monarchy must be truly apolitical. However, demands placed on the institution of royalism place pressures on it to intervene and create political outcomes, thus weakening its unifying function. We can alleviate such demands by either creating more constitutional sanctions for monarchs to resolve crises, or through mechanisms which anticipate such political loopholes and resolve them before the need for royal intervention, especially for the cases of dissolution of government.
In retrospect, there are many facets of the Malaysian monarchy that I have largely ignored: conspicuously absent is their dramatic relationship between the monarchy and Mahathir and the actual prerogatives of the Malaysian monarch that render their office beyond symbolism. We also do not have a sound theory of motivation for monarchs: when and why do constitutional monarchs act? What are their political considerations?
Upon researching and coming to my own conclusions about the Malaysian monarchy, I feel like I have alienated both my intended audiences of republicans and royalists. I have come to take into account the weaknesses of the Malaysian monarchy and yet defended the state of constitutional monarchy by proposing methods to improve upon it. To me, as a Malaysian who happens to fall in the non-Malay segment of society, the support of monarchy represents political accommodation. I hope I have sufficiently understood my Malay brothers and sisters in their support for the nature of the Malay sultanate as a stronghold of the Malay way of life and the upholding of Islam and balanced that with the needs of those living in the fringes of Malaysian royalism.
Bibliography
Bodganor,Vernon, 1995. The Monarchy and the Constitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kershaw, Roger, 2001. Monarchy in South-East Asia : the faces of tradition in transition.
New York : Routledge, 2001.
Raja Nazrin Shah, 2004. The monarchy in contemporary Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.
Spellman, W.M., 2001. Monarchies 1000-2000. London: Reaktion Books.
Ho Yi Jian is a Political Science graduate from the National University of Singapore. He writes at Kent Ridge Common on Malaysia, Singapore and campus issues.
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