Culture and Young People
By Dahlia Martin
The Politicisation of Culture
It is not a coincidence that the issue of culture in Malaysia was re-examined by government officials after 1969. It had been, after all, the year that saw the Alliance (the precursor to Barisan Nasional) losing its two-thirds majority for the first time since Malaysia's independence and the subsequent racial riots.
Officially, these riots were said to have occurred spontaneously, and a connection was made between the manifestation of the riots and the socio-economic disadvantages of the Malays. Citing the need to pre-empt a similar event from occurring, the government (dominated then as it is now by UMNO) announced in July 1969 the promotion of a national ideology to achieve national unity.
The Rukun Negara, or National Principles, was announced a little over a year later. Today, the Rukun Negara is still featured in nation-building discourses; students recite it in schools, and in 2005, the government announced it was to be recited at all official functions and assemblies of government departments and agencies. There are five principles in the Rukun Negara. The first one - belief in God - was to help pave the way for promotion of religious-based ideologies. Different national ideologies and discourses promoted over the years have continued to make mention of faith, especially Islam, in what could be argued as political interference in the production of culture.
The legal and administrative link between Malay ethnicity and the Islamic faith helps to explain this in that, for decades now, UMNO has been concerned about the ability of PAS to appeal to the Malay electorate. Employing an increasingly Islamic rhetoric has now become a strategy of UMNO in positioning itself as the Malay political party.
What this has also translated into is a series of anxieties about the behaviour or cultural performances of Malaysians, in particular Malays, on the part of UMNO and anyone else concerned with maintaining Malay dominance in the political world. The existence of these anxieties makes way for a variety of scapegoats, including young people.
The Cultural Position of Young Adults
What young Malaysians do has become a cause for popular concern. Over the years, the country has witnessed several moral panics regarding young people in Malaysia. The focus of these panics have included boh-sia or promiscuous young women, young people attending heavy metal concerts, and other "Western influences" which clash with "local values".
Malay (and therefore, according to Malaysia's constitution, Muslim) youth often occupy a central part in these panics, indicating that this particular group of young people are more susceptible than other youths to being the scapegoat for anxieties. This revelation is hardly surprising considering the special focus on Malay youth in government-authorized ideologies and discourses. Take, for instance, the place of Malay youth in Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's ideology of Islam Hadhari (a discourse on "progressive" Islam which was viewed as a significant contributor to the electoral success of Barisan Nasional in the 2004 elections). Despite reaffirming, during several speeches on Islam Hadhari, his position as the premier of a multireligious nation, and despite reassurance that this ideology did not threaten the rights of non-Muslims, Badawi often addressed Islam Hadhari to a specific group of people, Malays.
He spoke of Malays needing to "possess the positive qualities that can enable them to be the prime movers of a developed nation" and "win the war". In his very first speech on Islam Hadhari at the UMNO General Assembly of 2004, Badawi revealed his specific ideas about who would win the "war" for the Malays. Youth, he said, were "an invaluable asset with tremendous potential" whose "views are very important in formulating national policies." He also put emphasis on developing an education system that would mould not only a young progressive adult, but a God-fearing one too, in a remark that sounded reminiscent of the first principle of the Rukun Negara. Young people, Badawi appeared to be saying, were essential for the success of the Malay race.
But somehow, these high expectations have resulted in a marginalization of the young. Despite the huge placed occupied by young people in government and public discourse, there is relatively small attention paid to them in scholarly work on Malaysia. The social powerlessness of young people has left them vulnerable to authoritative depictions. When all of this is put together, it is clear that the production of a moral panic in relation to youth culture is very easy.
As a result, the actual position of youth in relation to culture remains unknown, despite an acute awareness of what their roles and contributions to society are officially expected to be.
Policing Malay Youth
As mentioned previously, it is not only official institutions that are concerned with the position of the Malays; various social actors may also share similar concerns, and therefore may also be included in the policing of Malay youth. As an individual who is officially classified as a Malay, I can vouch for both of these assertions.
Ever since I first returned to Malaysia at the age of nine after my Australian father left his job as a diplomat, I have on too many occasions been accused of being sombong or arrogant about my Malay background, a Westernized young person who has forgotten my roots, and even a self-hating Malay. These accusations have come from local politicians, officials at government departments, security guards, school teachers, driving school instructors, a former editor of mine, family members, and acquaintances.
Friends have related similar stories to me. One young man I know recalled being scared of attending Islamic classes when he was in secondary school. His fear centred around the possibility that he might be called to recite a doa, be unable to recall it in full, and subsequently be chastised for a lack of Islamic knowledge and values.
I know one girl who, after joining a public university and getting the feeling that her Malay classmates were excluding her from social and academic activities, was chided by a university official for not following her classmates for prayers. The implication made was that had she attended prayers like a proper Malay Muslim, she would not feel excluded.
These charges, I theorize, are yet another method, albeit one more subtle than overt blaming as per public discourses, in the policing of Malay culture, particularly in relation to youth. Whenever such a charge is made, there is a suggestion that there are certain facets which are central to Malay culture, and that the inability to assume these facets - threatens the interests of the Malays.
However, the effects of this policing and the targeting of young people in national ideologies and discourses is an area which needs to be further explored. As mentioned earlier, what young people really think and, specifically, what cultural discourses are employed in their everyday lives, remains largely unknown. Young peoples' lack of factual cultural representation continues.
Dahlia Martin has contributed to numerous publications in the past, including the New Straits Times, The Star and Malaysian Today. During her undergrad years, she was an active student leader, campaigning for wom*n's issues and increased political awareness on campus. She has just completed her BA (Hons) thesis on "Religious Discourses of Young-Adult Malaysian Muslims" at Monash University.